A la mi-juin, Un télégramme diplomatique a semé le trouble à l’Elysée. Sarkozy savait déjà que Kadhafi, lors d’un petit sommet arabe, le 10 juin, venait de qualifier d’« inacceptable » son projet de tenir, à Paris, la première assemblée d’une Union pour la Méditerranée. Mais un ambassadeur de France en avait appris davantage au Maghreb, sur les violents propos tenus, en privé, par le patron de la Libye. L’un des interlocuteurs du colonel s’était confié à lui. En compagnie de dirigeants marocains et tunisiens, il s’était fait tancer par Kadhafi qui les jugeait tous trop favorables à l’initiative française : « Vous êtes des colonisés ! » Grâce au diplomate français, l’Elysée et le Quai n’ignoraient donc rien de l’agressivité du chef libyen.

Dans la crainte que cet irascible persiste à vouloir « saboter » la réunion euro-méditerranéenne, qui doit s’ouvrir le 13 juillet, Sarko décida alors de lui accorder une séance de « câlinothérapie » intensive. En dépêchant auprès de lui son fidèle Claude Guéant, le secrétaire général de l’Elysée qui a négocié (avec Cécilia) la libération des infirmières bulgares détenues naguère à Tripoli.

Le 26 juin, Claude Guéant, «à la tête d’une délégation de haut niveau », précise l’agence libyenne Jana, atterrissait à Syrie (600 km à l’est de Tripoli), accompagné de trois généraux, d’un diplomate du Quai d’Orsay et de plusieurs membres de la Direction générale pour l’armement. Tous censés poursuivre la coopération en matière de défense et un « partenariat global » d’un point de vue stratégique : deux accords signés, le 25 juillet 2007, à Tripoli, en présence des télés françaises.

Bons baisers de Damas

Ce déploiement de forces et cet assaut de bonnes manières, plus les arguments avancés par Guéant, un habitué des lieux et des conversations avec les barbouzes locales, ont fini par amener Kadhafi à en rabattre. Plus conciliant que d’ordinaire, il enverra au « congrès constitutif de l’Union pour la Méditerranée » – on ne fait pas plus pompeux… – une délégation d’observateurs conduite par le ministre libyen des Affaires étrangères. Kadhafi n’a donc pas déçu Sarko, et celui-ci sera à la fête : les représentants de 44 pays sont attendus à Paris, le 13 juillet, et, en principe, 33 chefs d’Etat. Cela fait beaucoup pour la seule Méditerranée, mais la chancelière allemande Merkel a contraint le président français à inviter tous les Européens à cet immense foutoir.

La présence des Israéliens à la table de cette réunion étant l’un des prétextes invoqués par Kadhafi pour rejeter l’initiative française, Sarkozy avait appelé à l’aide Bachar El.-Assad. Et le chef syrien, lui aussi attendu à Paris, s’est fait un plaisir de téléphoner à son collègue libyen. L’histoire ne dit pas si le colonel lui a reproché de négocier avec Israël, via la Turquie, mais toujours est-il que ce nouvel ami de la France a accepté d’entrer dans le jeu élyséen.

A la demande de Sarkozy, le Quai d’Orsay a voulu connaître les réactions des Etats arabes sur ce point précis : l’évolution de la politique française à l’égard d’Israël. Interrogés par télégramme, les ambassadeurs de France ont répondu, en substance, qu’ils n’avaient pas décelé de “réactions trop hostiles ». Ce qui fait sourire un diplomate incrédule : « Ils ont peur de se mouiller. Ils ne veulent pas donner l’impression qu’ils critiquent le Président. »

Autre preuve que rien n’est simple dans cette région. Lors de sa visite en Israël, Sarko avait cru possible de tenir, le 22 juin, sur les rives de la mer Noire, une conférence France-Israël-Jordanie-Palestine. Un coup pour rien : le roi de Jordanie et Mahmoud Abbas ont refusé d’accorder ce plaisir au président français. « Et de faire comme si, affirme, sur place, un diplomate français, les Israéliens ne continuaient pas d’installer de nouvelles colonies à Jérusalem-Est et en Cisjordanie. »

Sarko a reproché à Ehoud Olmert de trop bétonner la Palestine. Apparemment, il ne l’a guère convaincu.

Claude Angeli



Publié dans le Canard Enchaîné du mercredi 2 juillet 2008
Mis en ligne par www.nawaat.org

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Dans un communiqué reçu par courrier électronique le 2 juillet 2008, AI affirme que Ziad Fakraoui, ancien prisonnier et victime présumée d’actes de tortures lors de sa détention et dont le cas a été cité dans le rapport, et depuis « victime de ce qui s’apparente à des représailles de la part des autorités tunisiennes.»

« Ziad Fakraoui, […] a été arrêté par des agents des services de sécurité en civil, le 25 juin 2008, deux jours après la publication du document, et n’a pas été revu depuis son arrestation. Les responsables des services de sécurité qui l’ont emmené ont dit à sa mère qu’ils le conduisaient au ministère de l’Intérieur mais ont refusé d’indiquer le motif de son arrestation. Sa famille et ses avocats ont cherché, en vain, à obtenir de ses nouvelles après son arrestation. Les avocats ont appris ce mercredi 2 juillet uniquement, soit sept jours après son arrestation, qu’il avait été présenté à un juge d’instruction le 28 juin et inculpé d’appartenance à une organisation terroriste et d’incitation au terrorisme. »

Rapporte le communiqué.

Or, il se trouve, comme le rappelle AI, que Ziad Fakraoui a déjà été arrêté en 2005, jugé puis condamné à douze ans d’emprisonnement en décembre 2007 - peine ramenée à 3 ans après appel en mai 2008 - pour les mêmes faits qui lui sont reprochés aujourd’hui. C’est donc pour répondre aux mêmes accusations qu’il a été présenté devant le juge d’instruction au mépris du droit tunisien ainsi qu’au mépris de toutes les conventions internationales condamnant les peines multiples (voir le documentaire sur le drame des peines multiples en Tunisie). Cette entorse flagrante au droit n’est pas la seule commise à l’encontre de M Fakraoui par les autorités tunisiennes. « Le fait que personne n’ait été informé du lieu où il était détenu signifie qu’il a été détenu au secret pendant plus longtemps que la période de six jours autorisée par la loi tunisienne. » Précise Amnesty international.

Craignant pour sa sécurité, l’organisation à par ailleurs lancé un appel pour soutenir le prisonnier en exprimant dans un communiqué reçu par email le 3 juillet 2008 (voir plus bas le communiqué en anglais), « ses craintes de tortures et mauvais traitements » dont pourrait être victime M Fakraoui, rappelant l’article 13 du code de procédures criminelles tunisien qui stipule que :

« Les suspects ne peuvent être détenus par la police ou par la gendarmerie nationale pendant plus de trois jours. Le procureur public à le pouvoir d’étendre cette détention de trois jours supplémentaires « en cas de nécessité ». Les autorités sont obligées d’informer les prisonniers des poursuites engagées à leur encontre, la raison et la durée de leur détention et de leurs droits garantis par la loi, incluant le droit à un examen médical durant ou après la détention. Ils sont également tenus d’informer un membre de la famille proche du détenu de son arrestation et de sa détention. »

Comme nous venant de le voir et comme presque toujours, c’est plus au niveau des responsables de l’application de la loi qu’a la loi elle-même qu’incombe les pratiques les plus honteuses décriées ici par Amnesty international mais aussi ailleurs par d’autres organisations nationales et internationales. Encore une fois la justice tunisienne accepte de se salir les mains en effectuant les basses besognes d’un régime totalitaire qui a fait de l’intimidation, de la répression et de la torture un pilier de sa politique exercée en Tunisie depuis voilà maintenant plus de deux décennies.

Malek Khadhraoui
www.nawaat.org

————————————————————————————————————————-

3 July 2008

TUNISIA : Fear of torture or ill-treatment

Ziad Fakraoui is now known to be detained in Mornaguia prison, some 15km east of Tunis. His family was allowed to visit him but he has not been permitted access to a lawyer. When Ziad Fakraoui’s lawyer tried to visit on 3 July, prison guards told him that this was not possible for “medical reasons”, but did not give any further details. Ziad Fakraoui has been on hunger strike since 25 June in protest at his arrest.

Ziad Fakraoui was arrested on the morning of 25 June at his family home in Tunis by men in civilian clothing. The men identified themselves as state security officials, and told Ziad Fakraoui’s mother that they were taking him to the Ministry of the Interior. His family were not told where he was until 2 July, when they were informed by his lawyer. His family were able to visit him the same day.

On 2 July, Ziad Fakraoui’s lawyers were told that he had been brought before an investigating judge without the assistance of a lawyer on 28 June, and he faced charges of belonging to a terrorist organization and incitement to terrorism. These were the same charges for which he was arrested in 2005 and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment in December 2007, reduced to three years on appeal in May 2008. Ziad Fakraoui was released on 24 May 2008 as he had already served his sentence. The police report indicates that he was arrested on 26 June, one day after the actual arrest date.

The fact that no one was informed of his whereabouts meant that in effect, Ziad Fakraoui was held in prolonged incommunicado detention for longer than the maximum six-day period allowed under Tunisian law.

Under Article 13 of Tunisia’s Code of Criminal Procedure, suspects may not be detained by the police or the National Guard for more than three days. The Public Prosecutor has the power to extend this by a further three days in “cases of necessity.” The authorities are required to notify detainees of the procedures against them; the reason for and duration of their detention; and of the guarantees provided to them by law, including the right to medical examination during or after the detention. They must also notify a member of the detainee’s immediate family of the arrest and detention.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Please send appeals to arrive as quickly as possible, in Arabic, French, English or your own language:

- urging the Tunisian authorities to grant Ziad Fakraoui immediate and regular access to his lawyer, and to ensure that he is not tortured or otherwise ill-treated in detention;
- calling on the authorities to give him regular access to his family and any medical treatment he may require;
- urging the Tunisian authorities to promptly charge Ziad Fakraoui with a recognizably criminal offence and bring him before a court in fair proceedings, or to release him;
- calling upon the authorities to ensure that Ziad Fakraoui’s family are not harassed by Tunisian security forces;
- calling for a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations that Ziad Fakraoui was tortured in 2005, and that those found responsible are brought to justice;
- reminding the authorities that as parties to the UN Convention against Torture, they are obliged to promptly investigate any allegations of torture.

APPEALS TO:

Minister of the Interior
Rafik Haj Kacem
Ministère de l’Intérieur
Avenue Habib Bourguiba
1000 Tunis
Tunisia
Fax: + 216 71 340 888
Salutation: Your Excellency

Minister of Justice and Human Rights
M. Béchir Tekkari
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
31 Boulevard Bab Benat
1006 Tunis - La Kasbah
Tunisia
Fax: + 216 71 568 106
Salutation: Your Excellency

COPIES TO:

Mr. Ridha Khemakhem
General Coordinator for Human Rights
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
31 Boulevard Bab Benat
1006 Tunis - La Kasbah
Tunisia

and diplomatic representatives of Tunisia accredited to your country.

PLEASE SEND APPEALS IMMEDIATELY. Check with the International Secretariat, or your section office, if sending appeals after 28 August 2008.

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Adnane Hajji s’était fait connaître par la solidarité qu’il a apportée aux diplômés chômeurs de la région dans le mouvement qui a suivi l’annonce de résultats manipulés d’un concours de recrutement ouvert par la société de phosphates, et ce, au profit des proches de quelque notables locaux. Parce qu’il avait dénoncé l’implication des cadres syndicaux régionaux dans la manipulation, l’UGTT a gelé son statut syndical et il a été convoqué devant le conseil de discipline.

Adnane Hajji était secrétaire général du syndicat de l’enseignement de base dans la région. Le 23 juin dernier, il a été arrêté à nouveau et déféré devant le juge d’instruction du Tribunal de Première Instance de Gafsa, puis écroué à la prison de Kasserine. Le 30, il devait être interrogé à nouveau par le juge d’instruction mais son interrogatoire a été reporté sine die.

Brève rencontre aujourd’hui avec Jomaa Hajji :

* Quel est votre sentiment depuis l’arrestation de votre mari ?

De façon générale, je suis honorée d’être la femme d’un homme comme lui : d’un syndicaliste qui a toujours mis l’intérêt général avant ses intérêts propres, au point d’y laisser sa santé, qui n’a jamais cherché son profit personnel. C’est rare de rencontrer des personnes comme lui : il est convaincu, principiel, humain. Il fait passer l’humain avant tout;

* Et vous-même, où vous situez-vous ?

Moi ? Je ne travaille pas, j’ai tenté de travailler mais cela a été impossible, on m’en a empêchée, parce que j’étais la femme d’Adnane Hajji ! Par ailleurs, je suis malade, avec un traitement lourd.

* Avant sa dernière arrestation, avez-vous senti monter les menaces ?

Oui, d’abord il a été gelé du syndicat en janvier 2008. Ensuite, il a voulu aller à Tunis, mais il n’a pas dépassé Kairouan. Il était à bord d’un louage. La police l’a obligé à faire demi-tour, pourtant la circulation est un droit de tout citoyen tunisien. Et il n’a rien fait, rien de répréhensible. Il est simplement connu et apprécié de tous.

* Comment se passent les visites en prison ?

Je ne l’ai vu qu’une fois, j’ai droit aux visites une fois par semaine. Tout d’abord, il a fallu le trouver. Je lui a apporté ses médicaments au poste de police. On m’a renvoyée en me disant qu’il n’y était pas. Même chose pour la prison : pendant trois jours, j’ai fait des allers et retours entre les prisons de Kasserine et de Gafsa, chacune des deux administrations me disant qu’il était dans l’autre prison. Finalement je l’ai trouvé à Kasserine.

* Comment s’est passée la visite ?

Le trajet est très long et coûteux, plus ou moins 140 kilomètres, je m’y suis rendue avec notre fille, qui a dix huit ans, pour… cinq minutes ! Le temps d’une visite ! je lui ai parlé par téléphone. Pourquoi n’est-il pas à la prison de Gafsa, ce serait plus proche de chez nous.

* Comment va-t-il ?

Je l’ai trouvé fatigué. Pendant sa garde à vue il est resté vingt sept heures assis sur une chaise. Ils l’ont privé de sommeil, tout cela pour l’obliger à signer des aveux ! Tout ce dont on l’accuse, ce sont les BOP * qui l’ont fait !

* Une campagne internationale est en train de se mettre en place pour exiger sa libération…

Ici à Redeyef, on ne peut plus rien faire; vous savez, l’armée à pris place. Il y a eu de nouvelles arrestations hier : Béchir Laabidi, un syndicaliste qui a été arrêté avec son fils, qui a vingt deux ans qui est malade. Et pourtant il a été frappé et arrêté, et d’autres syndicalistes ont été arrêtés, comme Tarek Hlaïmi. Ils rentrent dans les maisons, sans autre formalité, et procèdent à des arrestations en série. Cependant, la résistance continue, j’ai entendu dire qu’à la prison de Gafsa, les personnes du bassin minier sont en grève de la faim depuis samedi pour leur libération. Je remercie toutes les personnes qui se sont mobilisées pour nous. Il faut continuer pour que mon mari soit libéré, pour qu’il soient tous libérés. Ce que nous vivons est une injustice.

* BOP : Brigade d’ordre public

Propos recueillis par Luiza Toscane le 2 juillet 2008

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Ziad Fakraoui, whose case was featured in the Amnesty International report, In the Name of Security: Routine Abuses in Tunisia (MDE 30/007/2008), was re-arrested by state security officials in civilian clothes on 25 June 2008, two days after the report’s publication, and has not been seen since. The security agents who took him away told his mother that they were taking him to the Ministry of the Interior but refused to give any reason for his arrest. Although his family and lawyers sought news about his whereabouts since his arrest, they were not able to obtain any information. Lawyers learnt only today, seven days after his arrest, that he was brought before an investigating judge on 28 June and charged with belonging to a terrorist organization and incitement to terrorism. These were the same charges for which he was arrested in 2005 and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment in December 2007, reduced to three years on appeal in May 2008. He was released on 24 May as having already served his sentence. The fact that no one was informed of his whereabouts meant in effect that he was held in prolonged incommunicado detention for longer than the maximum six day period allowed under Tunisian law. He is currently detained in Mornaguia prison where his lawyers and family are yet to get access to him.

In its report, Amnesty International said such practices, including unlawfully prolonged detentions, which amount to enforced disappearances and create the conditions for torture and other abuse of detainees, were common, and called on the Tunisian government to end such abuses and hold its security forces to account.

Two Tunisian lawyers and human rights defenders, Samir Dilou and Anouar Kousri, who spoke at a press conference on 23 June in Paris on Amnesty International report, were harassed by security officials when they returned to Tunis. They were held for up to two hours at Tunis airport by security officials who searched them and their luggage. Subsequently, police visited their homes and told them that they should report at a police station without providing any reasons, and they were questioned about their participation in the Amnesty International press conference by police who accused them of circulating false information and harming Tunisia’s image abroad. Samir Dilou was threatened with prosecution if he continues such activities.

Amnesty International is urging the Tunisian government to end the practice of illegal detention in Tunisia and harassment of Samir Dilou, Anouar Kousri and other human rights defenders, and to take concrete measures to address the human rights violations described in its recent report and other reports by Tunisian human rights organizations.



Received by email from Amnesty International

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وتضامنا مع الرأي الحرّ ننشر مدخل الكتاب

المستقبل

لنتصوّر عرّافا وقف أمام جيلي سنة 1965 يقرأ لنا بخت الأمّة في كفّ التاريخ وأنه قال لنا ما يلي : أطلب منكم سماعي دون فقدان الصواب فأنا جدّ آسف يا شباب .. سيقع عكس ما ترجون وما تخططون له من وحدة وحرية واشتراكية وتحرير فلسطين ،ناهيكم عن التعامل مع الغرب ندّا لند وعودة الأمة بقوة لساحة العلم والتكنولوجيا والإبداع الفني والفكري .

ففي سنة 2006 أي بعد أربعين سنة من الآن ستكون حصيلة الآمال والأقوال والأفعال لجيلكم وللذي سبقه ما يلي :

- انقلاب الأنظمة التحررية القومية إلى أنظمة طائفية واحتلال داخلي ،أين قمع الاستعمار من قمعها

- هزيمة عسكرية قاصمة للظهر أمام إسرائيل، ثم اعتراف مصر – نعم مصر- بإسرائيل، ثم تسابق الأنظمة للاعتراف بالكيان الصهيوني.

- بلوغ الشعب الفلسطيني البطل ذروة المأساة وهو يحارب ظهره إلى الحائط ، لا نصير له من الشعوب أو من الأنظمة.

- تعمق التبعية و التخلف لا بالنسبة للغرب فحسب وإنما حتى بالنسبة لأمم آسيا التي ستحقق هي المشاريع التي تحلمون بها.

- الانتصار بالضربة القاضية للرجعية العربية على ما تسمونه القوى التقدمية والوطنية.

- تبذير كميات لا تصدق من ثروات الشعوب والأمة في فساد الأشخاص أو في تكديس سلاح مهمته تشغيل مصانع الأجنبي والعمولات للأصدقاء والاستعداد لمواجهة الثورة الشعبية وحتى لضرب فلسطين.

- اندلاع حروب أهلية مدمرة في السودان والجزائر ولبنان والعراق.

- عودة الاحتلال الغربي المباشر للأرض العربية واحتلال عاصمة الرشيد بعد انهيار العراق.

- تكثف موجات هروب العرب من بلدانهم يستجيرون بالغرب الذي تحاربون.

- بداية تفكّك الأقطار نفسها عبر تراجع الحس الوطني وظهور حركات مناهضة لكل ما هو عربي داخل أكثر من قطر في المشرق والمغرب.

- انهيار الشعور القومي وتزايد الفرقة والبغض بين العرب أنفسهم دولا وشعوبا.

- عودة الصراع بين السنة والشيعة.

- تحوّل مشعل المقاومة إلى قوى مرجعيتها الدين وانهيار كل التيارات الاشتراكية والقومية.

ما من شكّ أنه لو قيل لنا مثل هذا الكلام لهزئنا بقائله وسخرنا منه وأشبعناه شتما وتكذيبا ومن المؤكد ضربا بالأحذية.

ولأن كل هذا حدث فلا داعي للسخرية من عرافنا ، بل علينا بعد الاعتذار له ترجيه مواصلة قراءة

مستقبل الأمة…لنقل إلى سنة 2056.

ربما سنسمع شيئا من هذا القبيل:

- تهشم الجزائر والمغرب والعراق وسوريا ولبنان إلى دويلات طائفية وعرقية.

- احتلال مصر لليبيا لتجد مخرجا من الضغط السكاني الهائل وانطلاق المقاومة الليبية الباسلة ضد الاحتلال الفرعوني الغاشم.

- إعلان الخلافة الإسلامية في الحجاز المحرّر من مملكة نجد المتحدة.

- اختفاء السودان من الخارطة بعد أن أخذت مصر شماله وتشاد غربه والجنوب جنوبه.

- مطالبة الهند الحازمة باحترام حقوق الأغلبية الهندية المدنية والسياسية في الخليج والتهديد بالتدخل العسكري وإعلان الحرب على إيران التي بسطت حمايتها على دول الخليج منذ سنة 2020

- اندلاع الحرب الهندية الإيرانية وتدمير كل منطقة الخليج.

- احتلال دولة إسرائيل الكبرى لمنابع النفط في إمارة البصرة التي طلبت حمايتها من مطامع إمارة العمارة.

- انتصاب دكتاتوريات إسلامية في الدويلات الناجية وهاجسها الوحيد تغطية شعر النساء وفرض الصلاة في أوقاتها في المدارس والجامعات والإدارات . تصاعد التململ داخل الشعوب من الجور الإسلامي وبداية المقاومة وتزايد عدد معتنقي الكاثوليكية وبداية الخصومات بين المغاربين الكاثوليك

و البروتستانت.

- على الصعيد الخارجي انضمام ”جملكيات” تونس و قسنطينة ووهران و تطوان إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي بصفتها محميات ديمقراطية ( إضافة إلى إمارة بيت الدين المسيحية الديمقراطية وسلطنة جبل العلويين الديمقراطية ة ودولة أسوان الديمقراطية الفرعونية غير المعترف بها من الأسرة الدولية )

كل هذا بجانب” الجملكيات” الأمازيغية المعترف بها و التي تضم كنفدرالية تيزي وزّو وأقادير والحسيمة وبني ملال ولها وضع مراقب فقط .

- قرار مجلس الأمن بإلغاء اللغة العربية كلغة رسمية في الأمم المتحدة .

- ظهور الطاعون في موجات متتالية في كامل المنطقة العربية (سابقا) واستشراء المجاعات نظرا تفاقم الجفاف الناجم عن تغير المناخ…ناهيك عن وصول أزمة المياه الصالحة للشرب إلى قمم أصبحت تهدد وجود الملايين.

- ظهور دين جديد في مصر يدعو إلى عبادة الملك فاروق ويبشّر بعودته القريبة ليحرر الشعب من الإسلاميين ومن الإسلام.

إذا اعتبر أحدكم أن مثل هذه الأفكار علامات سوداوية في المزاج تستوجب الالتجاء إلى أدوية مقاومة الانهيار لعصبي الحاد، فما عليه إلا أن يتصور نفسه شابا في الستينات وأن يعيد قراءة ما ورد في بداية الصفحة، ليتأكد أن ما حدث لنا بالمقارنة مع ما كنا نأمل ونتوقع، ليس أغرب مما قد ينتظرنا في منعطفات طريق يبدو أننا فقدنا السيطرة عليه ، تماما كما يقع لقائد سيارة في منحدرات جبلية وقد أصبحت بلا فرامل.

من يستطيع أن يكابر اليوم والقول أننا نعرف إلى أين نحن ذاهبون وعبر أي طريق.فأنظمتنا التي تفتعل قيادة الباخرة السكرى هي أول من يعلم أنها لا تتحكّم إلا في الركاب المحشورين في العنابر

و مسار الباخرة متروك للقضاء والقدر وإرادة القوى العظمى.

أما مجتمعاتنا فهي بصدد الانفجار إلى الداخل عبر تصاعد كل مؤشرات التحلل والتفكك، من ارتفاع نسب الطلاق والانتحار والإدمان والبطالة والهجرة والجريمة والتدين واللجوء للعنف الداخلي والإرهاب الخارجي.كل هذا في ظل تفاقم الأزمات البيئية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية وتحت حكم دول

كأنك تسمع طقطقة عظامها وهي بصدد الانهيار والتفكك.

كأننا انخرطنا منذ نصف قرن في الاتجاه المعاكس للذي كان بوسعه أن يصل بنا إلى برّ النجاة وكأنه ما زال أمامنا الكثير لننزلق حتى نرتمي في أحضان الخواء …الفوضى المطلقة.

بالطبع لا بد من رفض الاستسلام لأمر كهذا ، لكن من أين الطريق ؟

لو فكرنا في الطريقة التي نتقدم بها عليه ، أمما وأشخاصا، لاكتشفنا أن نتحرك بفعل أربعة قوى أساسية . الأولى هي قوة الدفع الآتية من أعماق التاريخ. إنها جملة العوامل البيئية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والثقافية التي حددت لحد الآن مصير المجموعات والأفراد.القوة الثانية هي قوة الجذب الآتية من أعماق المستقبل وهي مكونة من جملة الأحلام والمشاريع المبهمة التي نحملها في أعماقنا. أما القوة الثالثة فهي الصدف الناجمة عن تصادم عوامل بالغة التعقيد والتشابك . وفي الأخير تشكل أرادتنا وقدراتنا الواعية القوة الرابعة وهي قوة لا يجب أن نستهين بها حتى ولو بدت لنا متواضعة الفعل أمام القوى الثلاثة الأخرى.

لكن إشكالية هذه القوة الرابعة اعتمادها الكلي على المعلومات الدقيقة والتشخيص الصحيح والخيار الأنجع. هنا نصطدم بأننا، شعوبا وأفرادا، نتحرك داخل ضباب معرفي متواصل. فالمعلومات عن وضعنا الحقيقي إما ناقصة وإما مغلوطة وإما مشوشة بالهوس الأيدولوجي.

نحن لا نعي بما كنا نتخبط فيه إلا بعد الدروس القاسية للتجارب . آنذاك نتذكر كما كنا ساذجين في رؤانا ، لكن قل ما يخطر على بالنا أننا ربما نواصل أخطاء أخرى سيظهر حجمها بعد زمن ما.

لقائل أن يقول إذن من يضمن أن الوصفة المعقدة التي يوحي هذا الكتاب بوجودها ، حتى وإن يعرف صعوبة تطبيقها، ليست مرحلة جديدة من التخبط داخل الضباب.

الجواب بسيط : لا أحد.

كل ما يمكن التأكد منه والتأكيد عليه، أننا سنتقدم أكثر فأكثر على الطريق الصحيح وسنستطيع تدارك الأخطاء بسرعة أكبر، إذا وضعنا نصب أعيننا.. أنه علينا أن نكون حذرين من قناعاتنا أكثر من حذرنا من قناعات الآخرين … أن علينا ترك باب الحوار دوما مفتوحا لا محضورات ولا مقدسات ولا من يحزنون … أن علينا متابعة كل التجارب في العالم بعين يقظة وفكر نهم لنتعلم من التجارب الناجحة ونستولي عليها دون تردد … أن علينا قبول الطبيعة التجريبية والتخبرية empirique للمسار البشري.

بهذه الذهنية وبهذه الذهنية وحدها ، يمكننا أن نرفع نسبة التخيير في مسارنا على نسبة التسيير ، علما ،وأننا شعوبا وأفرادا، سنبقى إلى ابد الدهر مسيرين ومخيرين.

هذا الكتاب هو دعوة لتنبني هذه الذهنية ، أكثر مما هو دعوة لتبني المقولات والآراء التى وردت فيه.

إن مسئولية المثقف ليست في التأثير على العوامل الموضوعية مثل البيئة والاقتصاد فهي تتجاوز كل الأشخاص وكل الفاعلين , لكن مسئوليته محددة بضرورة المتابعة الدقيقة لتطور المعلومات والأفكار واكتشاف خطوط القوة فيها والتوعية بها حوله لأنه بقدر ما تكون الأفكار التي يعمل المجتمع عليها واضحة وصحيحة، بقدر ما يسهل اتخاذ المواقف السياسية الأقل ضررا.

المثقف الملتزم ( وهو نقيض الأكاديمي من جهة وخادم السلطان من جهة أخرى) جزء هام من الآليات التي يضعها المجتمع لرفع مستوى نجاعة أخذ القرارات . وبقدر ما يلتزم هذا المثقف بمطلق الاستقلالية والنزاهة بقدر ما ينجح في لعب دور في جوقة لها عديد من العازفين ، لكنهم للأسف في نشاز أغلب الوقت.

وسواء أضاف هذا الكتاب- وهو في جزءه الأساسي مقالات نشرتها متفرقة على موقعي وفي الصحف وأخرى لم يسبق نشرها - شيئا جديدا أم زاد في الضجيج المنكر للأصوات المتنافرة ، فما أتمناه هو أن يضع على الأقل بعض العلامات على طريق صعب وغامض وخطير ، حتى يمكن لرفاق المغامرة الجماعية تبين بعض معالمه داخل الضباب الكثيف و كلما تطلب الأمر تحويل العلامات من مكان لآخر وتحسينها والإضافة إليها ، لنخرج جميعا بأسرع ما يمكن من الحلقات المفرغة ونتجه أخيرا إلى الأمام …على الأقل ألا نتجه في الطريق المعاكس لنرمي أنفسنا في براثن أخشى ما نخشاه.

قد نكون دخلنا منعرجات طريق ليس له إلا وجهة واحدة ونحن ما زلنا نتوهم قدرة الفعل.

قد لا نكون دخلنا مثل هذا المنعرج ولا زال أمامنا متسع الوقت لإنقاذ مستقبل أبنائنا وأحفادنا.

وفي كلتي الحالتين، نحن مطالبون بالأمل والعمل، لأن هذه سنة الحياة، والأمر كان ولا يزال : اعملوا فسيرى اللّه…

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Clandestine operations against Iran are not new. United States Special Operations Forces have been conducting cross-border operations from southern Iraq, with Presidential authorization, since last year. These have included seizing members of Al Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, and the pursuit of “high-value targets” in the President’s war on terror, who may be captured or killed. But the scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials. Many of these activities are not specified in the new Finding, and some congressional leaders have had serious questions about their nature.

Under federal law, a Presidential Finding, which is highly classified, must be issued when a covert intelligence operation gets under way and, at a minimum, must be made known to Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and the Senate and to the ranking members of their respective intelligence committees—the so-called Gang of Eight. Money for the operation can then be reprogrammed from previous appropriations, as needed, by the relevant congressional committees, which also can be briefed.

“The Finding was focussed on undermining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and trying to undermine the government through regime change,” a person familiar with its contents said, and involved “working with opposition groups and passing money.” The Finding provided for a whole new range of activities in southern Iran and in the areas, in the east, where Baluchi political opposition is strong, he said.

Although some legislators were troubled by aspects of the Finding, and “there was a significant amount of high-level discussion” about it, according to the source familiar with it, the funding for the escalation was approved. In other words, some members of the Democratic leadership—Congress has been under Democratic control since the 2006 elections—were willing, in secret, to go along with the Administration in expanding covert activities directed at Iran, while the Party’s presumptive candidate for President, Barack Obama, has said that he favors direct talks and diplomacy.

The request for funding came in the same period in which the Administration was coming to terms with a National Intelligence Estimate, released in December, that concluded that Iran had halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003. The Administration downplayed the significance of the N.I.E., and, while saying that it was committed to diplomacy, continued to emphasize that urgent action was essential to counter the Iranian nuclear threat. President Bush questioned the N.I.E.’s conclusions, and senior national-security officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, made similar statements. (So did Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican Presidential nominee.) Meanwhile, the Administration also revived charges that the Iranian leadership has been involved in the killing of American soldiers in Iraq: both directly, by dispatching commando units into Iraq, and indirectly, by supplying materials used for roadside bombs and other lethal goods. (There have been questions about the accuracy of the claims; the Times, among others, has reported that “significant uncertainties remain about the extent of that involvement.”)

Military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon share the White House’s concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but there is disagreement about whether a military strike is the right solution. Some Pentagon officials believe, as they have let Congress and the media know, that bombing Iran is not a viable response to the nuclear-proliferation issue, and that more diplomacy is necessary.

A Democratic senator told me that, late last year, in an off-the-record lunch meeting, Secretary of Defense Gates met with the Democratic caucus in the Senate. (Such meetings are held regularly.) Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush Administration staged a preëmptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, “We’ll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America.” Gates’s comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch, and another senator asked whether Gates was speaking for Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. Gates’s answer, the senator told me, was “Let’s just say that I’m here speaking for myself.” (A spokesman for Gates confirmed that he discussed the consequences of a strike at the meeting, but would not address what he said, other than to dispute the senator’s characterization.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman is Admiral Mike Mullen, were “pushing back very hard” against White House pressure to undertake a military strike against Iran, the person familiar with the Finding told me. Similarly, a Pentagon consultant who is involved in the war on terror said that “at least ten senior flag and general officers, including combatant commanders”—the four-star officers who direct military operations around the world—“have weighed in on that issue.”

The most outspoken of those officers is Admiral William Fallon, who until recently was the head of U.S. Central Command, and thus in charge of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March, Fallon resigned under pressure, after giving a series of interviews stating his reservations about an armed attack on Iran. For example, late last year he told the Financial Times that the “real objective” of U.S. policy was to change the Iranians’ behavior, and that “attacking them as a means to get to that spot strikes me as being not the first choice.”

Admiral Fallon acknowledged, when I spoke to him in June, that he had heard that there were people in the White House who were upset by his public statements. “Too many people believe you have to be either for or against the Iranians,” he told me. “Let’s get serious. Eighty million people live there, and everyone’s an individual. The idea that they’re only one way or another is nonsense.”

When it came to the Iraq war, Fallon said, “Did I bitch about some of the things that were being proposed? You bet. Some of them were very stupid.”

The Democratic leadership’s agreement to commit hundreds of millions of dollars for more secret operations in Iran was remarkable, given the general concerns of officials like Gates, Fallon, and many others. “The oversight process has not kept pace—it’s been coöpted” by the Administration, the person familiar with the contents of the Finding said. “The process is broken, and this is dangerous stuff we’re authorizing.”

Senior Democrats in Congress told me that they had concerns about the possibility that their understanding of what the new operations entail differs from the White House’s. One issue has to do with a reference in the Finding, the person familiar with it recalled, to potential defensive lethal action by U.S. operatives in Iran. (In early May, the journalist Andrew Cockburn published elements of the Finding in Counterpunch, a newsletter and online magazine.)

The language was inserted into the Finding at the urging of the C.I.A., a former senior intelligence official said. The covert operations set forth in the Finding essentially run parallel to those of a secret military task force, now operating in Iran, that is under the control of JSOC. Under the Bush Administration’s interpretation of the law, clandestine military activities, unlike covert C.I.A. operations, do not need to be depicted in a Finding, because the President has a constitutional right to command combat forces in the field without congressional interference. But the borders between operations are not always clear: in Iran, C.I.A. agents and regional assets have the language skills and the local knowledge to make contacts for the JSOC operatives, and have been working with them to direct personnel, matériel, and money into Iran from an obscure base in western Afghanistan. As a result, Congress has been given only a partial view of how the money it authorized may be used. One of JSOC’s task-force missions, the pursuit of “high-value targets,” was not directly addressed in the Finding. There is a growing realization among some legislators that the Bush Administration, in recent years, has conflated what is an intelligence operation and what is a military one in order to avoid fully informing Congress about what it is doing.

“This is a big deal,” the person familiar with the Finding said. “The C.I.A. needed the Finding to do its traditional stuff, but the Finding does not apply to JSOC. The President signed an Executive Order after September 11th giving the Pentagon license to do things that it had never been able to do before without notifying Congress. The claim was that the military was ‘preparing the battle space,’ and by using that term they were able to circumvent congressional oversight. Everything is justified in terms of fighting the global war on terror.” He added, “The Administration has been fuzzing the lines; there used to be a shade of gray”—between operations that had to be briefed to the senior congressional leadership and those which did not—“but now it’s a shade of mush.”

“The agency says we’re not going to get in the position of helping to kill people without a Finding,” the former senior intelligence official told me. He was referring to the legal threat confronting some agency operatives for their involvement in the rendition and alleged torture of suspects in the war on terror. “This drove the military people up the wall,” he said. As far as the C.I.A. was concerned, the former senior intelligence official said, “the over-all authorization includes killing, but it’s not as though that’s what they’re setting out to do. It’s about gathering information, enlisting support.” The Finding sent to Congress was a compromise, providing legal cover for the C.I.A. while referring to the use of lethal force in ambiguous terms.

The defensive-lethal language led some Democrats, according to congressional sources familiar with their views, to call in the director of the C.I.A., Air Force General Michael V. Hayden, for a special briefing. Hayden reassured the legislators that the language did nothing more than provide authority for Special Forces operatives on the ground in Iran to shoot their way out if they faced capture or harm.

The legislators were far from convinced. One congressman subsequently wrote a personal letter to President Bush insisting that “no lethal action, period” had been authorized within Iran’s borders. As of June, he had received no answer.

Members of Congress have expressed skepticism in the past about the information provided by the White House. On March 15, 2005, David Obey, then the ranking Democrat on the Republican-led House Appropriations Committee, announced that he was putting aside an amendment that he had intended to offer that day, and that would have cut off all funding for national-intelligence programs unless the President agreed to keep Congress fully informed about clandestine military activities undertaken in the war on terror. He had changed his mind, he said, because the White House promised better coöperation. “The Executive Branch understands that we are not trying to dictate what they do,” he said in a floor speech at the time. “We are simply trying to see to it that what they do is consistent with American values and will not get the country in trouble.”

Obey declined to comment on the specifics of the operations in Iran, but he did tell me that the White House reneged on its promise to consult more fully with Congress. He said, “I suspect there’s something going on, but I don’t know what to believe. Cheney has always wanted to go after Iran, and if he had more time he’d find a way to do it. We still don’t get enough information from the agencies, and I have very little confidence that they give us information on the edge.”

None of the four Democrats in the Gang of Eight—Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, and House Intelligence Committee chairman Silvestre Reyes—would comment on the Finding, with some noting that it was highly classified. An aide to one member of the Democratic leadership responded, on his behalf, by pointing to the limitations of the Gang of Eight process. The notification of a Finding, the aide said, “is just that—notification, and not a sign-off on activities. Proper oversight of ongoing intelligence activities is done by fully briefing the members of the intelligence committee.” However, Congress does have the means to challenge the White House once it has been sent a Finding. It has the power to withhold funding for any government operation. The members of the House and Senate Democratic leadership who have access to the Finding can also, if they choose to do so, and if they have shared concerns, come up with ways to exert their influence on Administration policy. (A spokesman for the C.I.A. said, “As a rule, we don’t comment one way or the other on allegations of covert activities or purported findings.” The White House also declined to comment.)

A member of the House Appropriations Committee acknowledged that, even with a Democratic victory in November, “it will take another year before we get the intelligence activities under control.” He went on, “We control the money and they can’t do anything without the money. Money is what it’s all about. But I’m very leery of this Administration.” He added, “This Administration has been so secretive.”

One irony of Admiral Fallon’s departure is that he was, in many areas, in agreement with President Bush on the threat posed by Iran. They had a good working relationship, Fallon told me, and, when he ran CENTCOM, were in regular communication. On March 4th, a week before his resignation, Fallon testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying that he was “encouraged” about the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regarding the role played by Iran’s leaders, he said, “They’ve been absolutely unhelpful, very damaging, and I absolutely don’t condone any of their activities. And I have yet to see anything since I’ve been in this job in the way of a public action by Iran that’s been at all helpful in this region.”

Fallon made it clear in our conversations that he considered it inappropriate to comment publicly about the President, the Vice-President, or Special Operations. But he said he had heard that people in the White House had been “struggling” with his views on Iran. “When I arrived at CENTCOM, the Iranians were funding every entity inside Iraq. It was in their interest to get us out, and so they decided to kill as many Americans as they could. And why not? They didn’t know who’d come out ahead, but they wanted us out. I decided that I couldn’t resolve the situation in Iraq without the neighborhood. To get this problem in Iraq solved, we had to somehow involve Iran and Syria. I had to work the neighborhood.”

Fallon told me that his focus had been not on the Iranian nuclear issue, or on regime change there, but on “putting out the fires in Iraq.” There were constant discussions in Washington and in the field about how to engage Iran and, on the subject of the bombing option, Fallon said, he believed that “it would happen only if the Iranians did something stupid.”

Fallon’s early retirement, however, appears to have been provoked not only by his negative comments about bombing Iran but also by his strong belief in the chain of command and his insistence on being informed about Special Operations in his area of responsibility. One of Fallon’s defenders is retired Marine General John J. (Jack) Sheehan, whose last assignment was as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, where Fallon was a deputy. Last year, Sheehan rejected a White House offer to become the President’s “czar” for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. “One of the reasons the White House selected Fallon for CENTCOM was that he’s known to be a strategic thinker and had demonstrated those skills in the Pacific,” Sheehan told me. (Fallon served as commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific from 2005 to 2007.) “He was charged with coming up with an over-all coherent strategy for Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and, by law, the combatant commander is responsible for all military operations within his A.O.”—area of operations. “That was not happening,” Sheehan said. “When Fallon tried to make sense of all the overt and covert activity conducted by the military in his area of responsibility, a small group in the White House leadership shut him out.”

The law cited by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chain of command: from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White House and the uniformed military.

“The coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue civilian influence and direction of nonconventional military operations,” Sheehan said. “If you have small groups planning and conducting military operations outside the knowledge and control of the combatant commander, by default you can’t have a coherent military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.”

Admiral Fallon, who is known as Fox, was aware that he would face special difficulties as the first Navy officer to lead CENTCOM, which had always been headed by a ground commander, one of his military colleagues told me. He was also aware that the Special Operations community would be a concern. “Fox said that there’s a lot of strange stuff going on in Special Ops, and I told him he had to figure out what they were really doing,” Fallon’s colleague said. “The Special Ops guys eventually figured out they needed Fox, and so they began to talk to him. Fox would have won his fight with Special Ops but for Cheney.”

The Pentagon consultant said, “Fallon went down because, in his own way, he was trying to prevent a war with Iran, and you have to admire him for that.”

In recent months, according to the Iranian media, there has been a surge in violence in Iran; it is impossible at this early stage, however, to credit JSOC or C.I.A. activities, or to assess their impact on the Iranian leadership. The Iranian press reports are being carefully monitored by retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, who has taught strategy at the National War College and now conducts war games centered on Iran for the federal government, think tanks, and universities. The Iranian press “is very open in describing the killings going on inside the country,” Gardiner said. It is, he said, “a controlled press, which makes it more important that it publishes these things. We begin to see inside the government.” He added, “Hardly a day goes by now we don’t see a clash somewhere. There were three or four incidents over a recent weekend, and the Iranians are even naming the Revolutionary Guard officers who have been killed.”

Earlier this year, a militant Ahwazi group claimed to have assassinated a Revolutionary Guard colonel, and the Iranian government acknowledged that an explosion in a cultural center in Shiraz, in the southern part of the country, which killed at least twelve people and injured more than two hundred, had been a terrorist act and not, as it earlier insisted, an accident. It could not be learned whether there has been American involvement in any specific incident in Iran, but, according to Gardiner, the Iranians have begun publicly blaming the U.S., Great Britain, and, more recently, the C.I.A. for some incidents. The agency was involved in a coup in Iran in 1953, and its support for the unpopular regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—who was overthrown in 1979—was condemned for years by the ruling mullahs in Tehran, to great effect. “This is the ultimate for the Iranians—to blame the C.I.A.,” Gardiner said. “This is new, and it’s an escalation—a ratcheting up of tensions. It rallies support for the regime and shows the people that there is a continuing threat from the ‘Great Satan.’ ” In Gardiner’s view, the violence, rather than weakening Iran’s religious government, may generate support for it.

Many of the activities may be being carried out by dissidents in Iran, and not by Americans in the field. One problem with “passing money” (to use the term of the person familiar with the Finding) in a covert setting is that it is hard to control where the money goes and whom it benefits. Nonetheless, the former senior intelligence official said, “We’ve got exposure, because of the transfer of our weapons and our communications gear. The Iranians will be able to make the argument that the opposition was inspired by the Americans. How many times have we tried this without asking the right questions? Is the risk worth it?” One possible consequence of these operations would be a violent Iranian crackdown on one of the dissident groups, which could give the Bush Administration a reason to intervene.

A strategy of using ethnic minorities to undermine Iran is flawed, according to Vali Nasr, who teaches international politics at Tufts University and is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Just because Lebanon, Iraq, and Pakistan have ethnic problems, it does not mean that Iran is suffering from the same issue,” Nasr told me. “Iran is an old country—like France and Germany—and its citizens are just as nationalistic. The U.S. is overestimating ethnic tension in Iran.” The minority groups that the U.S. is reaching out to are either well integrated or small and marginal, without much influence on the government or much ability to present a political challenge, Nasr said. “You can always find some activist groups that will go and kill a policeman, but working with the minorities will backfire, and alienate the majority of the population.”

The Administration may have been willing to rely on dissident organizations in Iran even when there was reason to believe that the groups had operated against American interests in the past. The use of Baluchi elements, for example, is problematic, Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. clandestine officer who worked for nearly two decades in South Asia and the Middle East, told me. “The Baluchis are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as Al Qaeda,” Baer told me. “These are guys who cut off the heads of nonbelievers—in this case, it’s Shiite Iranians. The irony is that we’re once again working with Sunni fundamentalists, just as we did in Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties.” Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is considered one of the leading planners of the September 11th attacks, are Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists.

One of the most active and violent anti-regime groups in Iran today is the Jundallah, also known as the Iranian People’s Resistance Movement, which describes itself as a resistance force fighting for the rights of Sunnis in Iran. “This is a vicious Salafi organization whose followers attended the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists,” Nasr told me. “They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture.” The Jundallah took responsibility for the bombing of a busload of Revolutionary Guard soldiers in February, 2007. At least eleven Guard members were killed. According to Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support.

The C.I.A. and Special Operations communities also have long-standing ties to two other dissident groups in Iran: the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, known in the West as the M.E.K., and a Kurdish separatist group, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, or PJAK.

The M.E.K. has been on the State Department’s terrorist list for more than a decade, yet in recent years the group has received arms and intelligence, directly or indirectly, from the United States. Some of the newly authorized covert funds, the Pentagon consultant told me, may well end up in M.E.K. coffers. “The new task force will work with the M.E.K. The Administration is desperate for results.” He added, “The M.E.K. has no C.P.A. auditing the books, and its leaders are thought to have been lining their pockets for years. If people only knew what the M.E.K. is getting, and how much is going to its bank accounts—and yet it is almost useless for the purposes the Administration intends.”

The Kurdish party, PJAK, which has also been reported to be covertly supported by the United States, has been operating against Iran from bases in northern Iraq for at least three years. (Iran, like Iraq and Turkey, has a Kurdish minority, and PJAK and other groups have sought self-rule in territory that is now part of each of those countries.) In recent weeks, according to Sam Gardiner, the military strategist, there has been a marked increase in the number of PJAK armed engagements with Iranians and terrorist attacks on Iranian targets. In early June, the news agency Fars reported that a dozen PJAK members and four Iranian border guards were killed in a clash near the Iraq border; a similar attack in May killed three Revolutionary Guards and nine PJAK fighters. PJAK has also subjected Turkey, a member of NATO, to repeated terrorist attacks, and reports of American support for the group have been a source of friction between the two governments.

Gardiner also mentioned a trip that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, made to Tehran in June. After his return, Maliki announced that his government would ban any contact between foreigners and the M.E.K.—a slap at the U.S.’s dealings with the group. Maliki declared that Iraq was not willing to be a staging ground for covert operations against other countries. This was a sign, Gardiner said, of “Maliki’s increasingly choosing the interests of Iraq over the interests of the United States.” In terms of U.S. allegations of Iranian involvement in the killing of American soldiers, he said, “Maliki was unwilling to play the blame-Iran game.” Gardiner added that Pakistan had just agreed to turn over a Jundallah leader to the Iranian government. America’s covert operations, he said, “seem to be harming relations with the governments of both Iraq and Pakistan and could well be strengthening the connection between Tehran and Baghdad.”

The White House’s reliance on questionable operatives, and on plans involving possible lethal action inside Iran, has created anger as well as anxiety within the Special Operations and intelligence communities. JSOC’s operations in Iran are believed to be modelled on a program that has, with some success, used surrogates to target the Taliban leadership in the tribal territories of Waziristan, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the situations in Waziristan and Iran are not comparable.

In Waziristan, “the program works because it’s small and smart guys are running it,” the former senior intelligence official told me. “It’s being executed by professionals. The N.S.A., the C.I.A., and the D.I.A.”—the Defense Intelligence Agency—“are right in there with the Special Forces and Pakistani intelligence, and they’re dealing with serious bad guys.” He added, “We have to be really careful in calling in the missiles. We have to hit certain houses at certain times. The people on the ground are watching through binoculars a few hundred yards away and calling specific locations, in latitude and longitude. We keep the Predator loitering until the targets go into a house, and we have to make sure our guys are far enough away so they don’t get hit.” One of the most prominent victims of the program, the former official said, was Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior Taliban commander, who was killed on January 31st, reportedly in a missile strike that also killed eleven other people.

A dispatch published on March 26th by the Washington Post reported on the increasing number of successful strikes against Taliban and other insurgent units in Pakistan’s tribal areas. A follow-up article noted that, in response, the Taliban had killed “dozens of people” suspected of providing information to the United States and its allies on the whereabouts of Taliban leaders. Many of the victims were thought to be American spies, and their executions—a beheading, in one case—were videotaped and distributed by DVD as a warning to others.

It is not simple to replicate the program in Iran. “Everybody’s arguing about the high-value-target list,” the former senior intelligence official said. “The Special Ops guys are pissed off because Cheney’s office set up priorities for categories of targets, and now he’s getting impatient and applying pressure for results. But it takes a long time to get the right guys in place.”

The Pentagon consultant told me, “We’ve had wonderful results in the Horn of Africa with the use of surrogates and false flags—basic counterintelligence and counter-insurgency tactics. And we’re beginning to tie them in knots in Afghanistan. But the White House is going to kill the program if they use it to go after Iran. It’s one thing to engage in selective strikes and assassinations in Waziristan and another in Iran. The White House believes that one size fits all, but the legal issues surrounding extrajudicial killings in Waziristan are less of a problem because Al Qaeda and the Taliban cross the border into Afghanistan and back again, often with U.S. and NATO forces in hot pursuit. The situation is not nearly as clear in the Iranian case. All the considerations—judicial, strategic, and political—are different in Iran.”

He added, “There is huge opposition inside the intelligence community to the idea of waging a covert war inside Iran, and using Baluchis and Ahwazis as surrogates. The leaders of our Special Operations community all have remarkable physical courage, but they are less likely to voice their opposition to policy. Iran is not Waziristan.”

A Gallup poll taken last November, before the N.I.E. was made public, found that seventy-three per cent of those surveyed thought that the United States should use economic action and diplomacy to stop Iran’s nuclear program, while only eighteen per cent favored direct military action. Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to endorse a military strike. Weariness with the war in Iraq has undoubtedly affected the public’s tolerance for an attack on Iran. This mood could change quickly, however. The potential for escalation became clear in early January, when five Iranian patrol boats, believed to be under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, made a series of aggressive moves toward three Navy warships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz. Initial reports of the incident made public by the Pentagon press office said that the Iranians had transmitted threats, over ship-to-ship radio, to “explode” the American ships. At a White House news conference, the President, on the day he left for an eight-day trip to the Middle East, called the incident “provocative” and “dangerous,” and there was, very briefly, a sense of crisis and of outrage at Iran. “TWO MINUTES FROM WAR” was the headline in one British newspaper.

The crisis was quickly defused by Vice-Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, the commander of U.S. naval forces in the region. No warning shots were fired, the Admiral told the Pentagon press corps on January 7th, via teleconference from his headquarters, in Bahrain. “Yes, it’s more serious than we have seen, but, to put it in context, we do interact with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and their Navy regularly,” Cosgriff said. “I didn’t get the sense from the reports I was receiving that there was a sense of being afraid of these five boats.”

Admiral Cosgriff’s caution was well founded: within a week, the Pentagon acknowledged that it could not positively identify the Iranian boats as the source of the ominous radio transmission, and press reports suggested that it had instead come from a prankster long known for sending fake messages in the region. Nonetheless, Cosgriff’s demeanor angered Cheney, according to the former senior intelligence official. But a lesson was learned in the incident: The public had supported the idea of retaliation, and was even asking why the U.S. didn’t do more. The former official said that, a few weeks later, a meeting took place in the Vice-President’s office. “The subject was how to create a casus belli between Tehran and Washington,” he said.

In June, President Bush went on a farewell tour of Europe. He had tea with Queen Elizabeth II and dinner with Nicolas Sarkozy and Carla Bruni, the President and First Lady of France. The serious business was conducted out of sight, and involved a series of meetings on a new diplomatic effort to persuade the Iranians to halt their uranium-enrichment program. (Iran argues that its enrichment program is for civilian purposes and is legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Secretary of State Rice had been involved with developing a new package of incentives. But the Administration’s essential negotiating position seemed unchanged: talks could not take place until Iran halted the program. The Iranians have repeatedly and categorically rejected that precondition, leaving the diplomatic situation in a stalemate; they have not yet formally responded to the new incentives.

The continuing impasse alarms many observers. Joschka Fischer, the former German Foreign Minister, recently wrote in a syndicated column that it may not “be possible to freeze the Iranian nuclear program for the duration of the negotiations to avoid a military confrontation before they are completed. Should this newest attempt fail, things will soon get serious. Deadly serious.” When I spoke to him last week, Fischer, who has extensive contacts in the diplomatic community, said that the latest European approach includes a new element: the willingness of the U.S. and the Europeans to accept something less than a complete cessation of enrichment as an intermediate step. “The proposal says that the Iranians must stop manufacturing new centrifuges and the other side will stop all further sanction activities in the U.N. Security Council,” Fischer said, although Iran would still have to freeze its enrichment activities when formal negotiations begin. “This could be acceptable to the Iranians—if they have good will.”

The big question, Fischer added, is in Washington. “I think the Americans are deeply divided on the issue of what to do about Iran,” he said. “Some officials are concerned about the fallout from a military attack and others think an attack is unavoidable. I know the Europeans, but I have no idea where the Americans will end up on this issue.”

There is another complication: American Presidential politics. Barack Obama has said that, if elected, he would begin talks with Iran with no “self-defeating” preconditions (although only after diplomatic groundwork had been laid). That position has been vigorously criticized by John McCain. The Washington Post recently quoted Randy Scheunemann, the McCain campaign’s national-security director, as stating that McCain supports the White House’s position, and that the program be suspended before talks begin. What Obama is proposing, Scheunemann said, “is unilateral cowboy summitry.”

Scheunemann, who is known as a neoconservative, is also the McCain campaign’s most important channel of communication with the White House. He is a friend of David Addington, Dick Cheney’s chief of staff. I have heard differing accounts of Scheunemann’s influence with McCain; though some close to the McCain campaign talk about him as a possible national-security adviser, others say he is someone who isn’t taken seriously while “telling Cheney and others what they want to hear,” as a senior McCain adviser put it.

It is not known whether McCain, who is the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been formally briefed on the operations in Iran. At the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, in June, Obama repeated his plea for “tough and principled diplomacy.” But he also said, along with McCain, that he would keep the threat of military action against Iran on the table.

Seymour M. Hersh



Source : The New Yorker

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Cette photo, qui circule parmi les internautes égyptiens, nous a été transférée par l’un de nos Observateurs. Son message s’adresse aux femmes : sortez voilées pour éviter que les hommes ne vous tournent autour comme des mouches.

Cette campagne virale - le texte est en arabe égyptien, mais nous n’avons pas pu identifier l’origine du document - incite les femmes à porter le niqab, c’est-à-dire une tenue qui couvre entièrement le corps et ne laisse que les yeux découverts. En Egypte, le hijab, qui ne couvre qu’une partie du visage, est de plus en plus porté, mais le niqab reste lui très minoritaire.

“Je trouve ça insultant de comparer la femme à une sucette”

Farnaz Seifi est une féministe iranienne. Elle a porté le voile jusqu’à son arrivée en Europe l’année dernière.

” Mon expérience de femme dans le seul pays du monde où le port du voile est obligatoire m’a appris que cela ne nous prémunit en rien du harcèlement sexuel. En Iran, même les femmes qui portent le tchador [en Iran, le tchador est noir ; il couvre tout le corps et ne laisse que le visage apparaître] sont victimes de harcèlement. Même dans la rue ! J’ai rencontré beaucoup d’hommes en Iran qui affirment qu’une femme voilée est plus sexy.

Cette campagne découle d’une interprétation vraiment radicale de l’Islam. C’est de la pure propagande. Dans les textes islamiques, il est écrit de couvrir les cheveux et le cou, pas le visage. Et personnellement, je trouve ça insultant de comparer la femme à une sucette. Quelles que soient les personnes à l’origine de ce message, ils voient la femme comme un objet sexuel et comme un être inférieur. Limiter le choix des femmes ne sera jamais la bonne solution contre le harcèlement sexuel.

En Iran, on porte des jeans, des Converse et des foulards qui cachent à peine nos cheveux. On a réussi à adapter le foulard à la mode. Depuis que j’ai quitté l’Iran, je n’ai jamais plus porté le voile. Au début, j’étais vraiment heureuse. Je ne l’avais pas choisi et je n’ai jamais aimé le porter. Je n’avais d’ailleurs même pas pris de foulard dans ma valise.”

“Si elle [ma femme] décidait d’enlever son voile, je ne m’y opposerais pas.”

Abdul Monem Mahmoud est un blogueur membre des frères musulmans. Il vit au Caire.

” Selon la charia, la femme doit porter un voile qui couvre sa tête et son corps. Mais je pense que c’est sa volonté qui compte avant tout. Ma femme porte un voile qui couvre sa tête et son corps, mais elle a un jean en dessous. Si elle décidait d’enlever son voile, je ne m’y opposerais pas. Je respecte ses choix.

Le voile n’est pas un gage de respectabilité. C’est le comportement des femmes qui compte, leur éducation, leur intelligence. Car je connais des femmes voilées qui agissent contre la morale islamique.

Selon moi, cette image est réductrice parce qu’elle affirme que seule la femme voilée est “sérieuse”. Cette vision a de nombreux adeptes dans la société arabe et égyptienne. Les télévisions arabes prêchent souvent pour un voile complet. En Egypte, certains leaders religieux recommandent le “niqab” ou même la “burqa”. Mais je pense que c’est étranger à notre culture et à la religion musulmane.

C’est un discours influencé par le modèle iranien et par les wahhabites. Nous devons faire attention à ce que véhiculent les chaînes du satellite. Je suis un frère musulman, mais je respecte la liberté de chacun. Et la femme doit vivre en conformité avec ses désirs.”

Réactions publiées sur le site Les observateurs de la chaine d’information continue France24

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That self-defeating behaviour coined the phrase “Streisand effect”, illustrated by an axiom from John Gilmore, one of the pioneers of the internet, that: “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” But the big test of the rule is not whether it frustrates publicity-shy celebrities. It is whether it can overcome governments’ desire for secrecy.

In November 2007 Tunisia blocked access to the popular video-sharing sites YouTube and DailyMotion, which both carried material about Tunisian political prisoners. It was not for the first time, and many other countries have blocked access to such sites, either to protect public morals, or to spare politicians’ blushes. What was unusual this time was the response. Tunisian activists and their allies organised a “digital sit-in”, linking dozens of videos about civil liberties to the image of the presidential palace in Google Earth. That turned a low-key human-rights story into a fashionable global campaign.

It was the same story in Armenia in March, where the president, Robert Kocharian, ended his term in office with a media blackout that, supposedly, extended to blogs (self-published websites which typically contain the author’s personal observations and opinions). Like all other outlets, the authorities said, blogs could publish government news only. The result was a soaring number of blogs hosted on servers outside Armenia—all sharply critical of the authorities.

Some countries still think that the benefits of censorship are worth the opprobrium. China unabashedly blocks foreign news sites, with state-financed digital censors playing an elaborate game of cat and mouse with those trying to elude them. Saudi Arabia makes a positive virtue of the practice, warning those trying to access prohibited websites of the dangers of pornography: sources cited include the Koran and Cass Sunstein, an American scholar who argues that porn does not automatically deserve First Amendment protection.

Such authoritarian countries are increasingly co-operating: Chinese software for finding keywords and spotting dangerous sites is among the best in the world. But international co-operation cuts both ways. If Egypt, for example, buys Chinese web-censorship technology, the Egyptian bloggers may learn ways to bypass it from their Chinese colleagues before the technology arrives.

That may keep information flowing fairly freely. But it does not keep bloggers out of prison. Security officials who once scoffed at blogs, or ignored them completely in favour of bigger and more conspicuous targets, are now bringing their legal and other arsenals to bear. A common move is to expand media, information and electoral laws to include blogs. Last year, for example, Uzbekistan changed its media law to count all websites as “mass media”—a category subject to Draconian restriction. Belarus now requires owners of internet cafés to keep a log of all websites that their customers visit: in a country where internet access at home is still rare and costly, that is a big hurdle for the active netizen. Earlier this year Indonesia passed a law that made it much riskier to publish controversial opinions online. A Brazilian court has ruled that bloggers, like other media, must abide by restrictions imposed by the law on elections.

The chilling effect of such moves is intensified when governments back them up with imprisonment. From Egypt to Malaysia to Saudi Arabia to Singapore, bloggers have in recent months found themselves behind bars for posting materials that those in power dislike. The most recent Worldwide Press Freedom Index, published by Reporters Without Borders, a lobby group, estimates their number at a minimum of 64.

International human-rights organisations have taken up their cause. But the best and quickest way of defending those in prison may be with the help of other internet activists. Sami ben Gharbia, a Tunisian digital activist who now lives in exile in the Netherlands, says that this beats traditional human-rights outfits when it comes to informing the world about the arrest of fellow bloggers. He co-ordinates the campaigning efforts of Global Voices Online, a web-based outfit that began as a collator of offbeat blog content and has now branched out into lobbying for free speech.

Such issues were expected to be in sharp focus at Global Voices’ annual summit in Budapest this week, where hundreds of bloggers, academics, do-gooders and journalists from places like China, Belarus, Venezuela and Kenya were due to swap tips on how to outwit officialdom. The aim, says Ethan Zuckerman, a Harvard academic who cofounded Global Voices, is to build networks of trust and co-operation between people who would not instinctively look to the other side of the world for solutions to their problems.

That is a worthy if ambitious goal. Doubtless, authoritarian governments are in close touch too, sharing the best ways of dealing with the pestilential gadflies and troublemakers of the internet. But they will not be posting their conclusions online, for all to see. Which way works better? History will decide.

From The Economist print edition | Jun 26th 2008

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Curieux paradoxe, l’adjectif « lâche » a aussi un sens….propre !
Il signifie : méprisable, abject, infâme.
Mais il a, aussi, un sens figuré qui veut dire : flasque, mou, inconsistant.

Les journalistes tunisiens, présents à la réunion qui a eu lieu, mercredi 25 juin 2008, au siège de leur nouveau syndicat, s’interrogent encore lequel de ces deux niveaux sémantiques il faut attribuer à l’action entreprise, la veille, par une poignée de confrères dont certains ne sont même pas adhérents, et réclamant la réunion d’urgence du bureau exécutif élargi du syndicat, instance qui, statutairement, est encore en gestation.

S’agit-il, comme le soutiennent certains, d’une manœuvre concertée, planifiée, orchestrée, d’une machination téléguidée dont les auteurs ont été…lâchés (avec accent) à la dernière minute par leurs commanditaires ?

Ou s’agit-il, plutôt, comme d’autres l’ont affirmé au cours de la réunion, d’un acte isolé, individuel, désespéré, mené par un quarteron d’aventuriers, de mauvais perdants et de revanchards qui n’ont pas encore digéré leur défaite électorale ?

Quels que soient le niveau et le contenu sémantiques. Quels que soient les objectifs inavoués du parrain de cette action, un « re-traité » qui, apparemment, a encore besoin d’être « traité » et qui n’a même pas eu le courage d’assister à une réunion qu’il a lui-même réclamée, c’est à un échec cuisant – de ses auteurs, évidemment - que cette initiative malheureuse a abouti.

Formons donc l’espoir que ces comploteurs invétérés et leurs donneurs d’ordre auront enfin compris la leçon et tiré les enseignements qui s’imposent.

Il n’est pas interdit de rêver !!!

Venons-en, maintenant, aux faits !

En lisant le texte de la lettre adressée au bureau exécutif du syndicat, on se croirait face à des enfants de chœur, des âmes charitables, des bénévoles désintéressés, des philanthropes, des personnes fortement bouleversées par le triste sort de leur syndicat qu’ils ont à cœur de sortir de la « grave situation de crise » qu’il traverse.

Les auteurs de la lettre réclament la réunion d’une instance, le bureau exécutif élargi, qui est en cours de constitution et qui regroupe, en plus du bureau exécutif, les présidents des commissions permanentes, lesquelles ne seront renouvelées, statutairement, qu’à partir du 1er juillet 2008, les présidents des sections d’entreprises, non encore constituées, et les présidents des sections régionales, les seules qui soient en situation régulière.

Les signataires de la lettre ont poussé l’outrecuidance jusqu’à « consentir » à ce que « les membres du bureau exécutif élus » puissent, « s’ils le souhaitent » assister à la réunion et « autant que possible » que le président du syndicat lui-même en dirige les travaux, lui qui, statutairement incarne l’instance exclusive habilitée à convoquer ce genre de réunion !!!

Ils ont, par ailleurs, été si « magnanimes » qu’ils n’ont pas voulu imposer un ordre du jour bien précis !!!

Le comble est que c’est le parrain de cette action, en personne, qui est en train de mobiliser tous les moyens pour empêcher la constitution de ce bureau exécutif élargi dont il réclame la réunion. Quelques jours auparavant, il avait, en effet, exercé des pressions, poussant l’audace jusqu’à parler au nom du président du syndicat, pour empêcher les responsables des sections régionales d’assister à une réunion convoquée par le bureau exécutif.

Le comble du comble c’est que cette instance dirigeante dont on réclame aujourd’hui urgemment la réunion, et qui s’appelait « comité directeur élargi », sous la défunte AJT, n’a tenu qu’une seule assemblée en quatre ans et ce fut juste pour discuter de la suspension de trois adhérents.

Pour ce qui est des commissions permanentes dont les signataires s’estiment être encore des membres de plein droit, elles sont toutes au point mort depuis quatre ans. Sauf une qui a tenu une petite réunion à la veille du congrès constitutif du SNJT. Beaucoup de membres de ces commissions ne font plus partie de la profession. Beaucoup d’autres ne sont plus adhérents du syndicat.

Bref, personne n’est dupe. Les ficelles sont de plus en plus grosses et les artifices de plus en plus grossiers. Alors, bas les masques et arrêtons de jouer la comédie !

Ceux qui sont réellement préoccupés et inquiets de l’avenir de cette profession, ceux qui veulent réellement défendre leur métier, notamment les jeunes qui ont élu ce bureau, ceux qui veulent, concrètement, aider ce syndicat n’ont qu’à mettre la main à la pâte. Sans attendre une quelconque échéance, sans faire de calculs, sans s’accrocher aux oripeaux. Ce ne sont pas les dossiers ni les chantiers qui manquent.

Ces propos peuvent sembler excessifs pour certains. Ils sont pourtant très en deçà de la réalité. Car les intrigues, les manœuvres et les complots qui se trament, de toutes parts, contre le nouveau syndicat des journalistes vont se poursuivre et ne s’arrêteront pas de sitôt.

Et ce sont les journalistes eux-mêmes, et eux-seuls, qui en assumeront la responsabilité et les conséquences.

Par leur démission, leur désertion, leur insouciance, leur manque d’engagement, pour certains. Par leur duplicité, leur hypocrisie, leur complicité et leur connivence, pour d’autres.



Source : Le Blog de Candide

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